The article analyses the Brazilian experience on financing economic activity from the 1964-67 reform until the nineties. Two issues are addressed: first, what conditions explain the development of a model based on public and on external credit" in Brazil, quite different from the capital market based system conceived in the 1964-67 reform; second, what are the perspectives for the development of an alternative model in the country, led by the national private sector. Based on international experience, two alternatives are considered: a) the expansion of the capital market, in order to make possible a large scale direct financing; b) the formation of a private banking credit system, complementing or replacing both public and external credit. Despite incontestable improvements, tendencies observed up to 1997 suggest the persistence of the "short-termist" profile that always characterised the Brazilian financial system. Thus, the development of both capital market and banking credit models depends on financial policies devoted to this goal. General guidelines for such policies are suggested in the last section of the paper.
INTRODUCTION
In his analysis of industrialisation experience of advanced economies in the post war, Zysman (Governments, Markets, 1983) distinguishes three investment paradigmatic financing models: the capital market system, developed in United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA); the private (banking) credit system, which has Germany as its typical case; and the government (or public) credit system, represented by the French and Japanese experiences.
In Brazil, the first attempt by the government to reorganise the financial structure was the 1964-67 financial reform. In this occasion, a capital market system was planned, following the US model. In fact, however, a quite different system emerged in Brazil, one that was based on public and external credit. Though far from the original plan, it was capable to promote and support the country's late industrialisation process.
During the 1980's however, a sharp decrease in government savings, and the international liquidity shortage triggered by the Latin-American foreign debt crisis, led to the collapse of the Brazilian financing model. In the 1990's, the country's adhesion to the "minimum State" model and the financial liberalisation policy -initiated in the Collor de Mello's government (1990) and intensified in the first mandate of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-98) -confirmed the impossibility of reproducing the old financing model. This condition suggests two ways for financial system development in Brazil: a) the expansion of domestic capital market, leading to the possibility of a large scale direct financing; b) the formation of a private banking credit system, as a complement or substitute for public and external credit.
This article examines the Brazilian experience of investment financing since the 1964-67 reform, and the perspectives of development of a new model, led by the national private sector.
Section 2 presents the analytical framework that leads the analysis, following the taxonomy of financing models proposed by Zysman. Section 3 examines the Brazilian financing experience, from the 1964-67 reform until the end of the 1980's. Section 4 makes the same for the 1990's, since it is quite distinctive from the previous decade in several aspects, especially in what regards the macroeconomic and institutional features. Section 5 discusses some perspectives of development of a new financing model in Brazil, suggesting ways for financial policy. Section 6 summarises and concludes the paper.
INVESTMENT FINANCE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.Financing Models
Capital market systems (CMS) were developed in the early industrialising economies, being the United Kingdom and the USA as their classical examples. As the name suggests, it is characterised by the significance of capital market in the process of investment financing. The typical suppliers of funds in this model are non-banking financial institutions, which usually issue medium-and long-term liabilities and hold assets with similar maturity structure. Commercial banks, in turn, advance short-term credit, matching with the shortest term of their liabilities.
The typical structure of CMS is diversified and specialised. The financial instruments to which each type of financial institution may have access, according with the country's financial regulation, determine specialisation. Wider regulation and segmentation are, therefore, features of such systems 2 . However, these characteristics are being gradually eroded in the CMS modelcountries, which, since the beginning of the 1980's, have gone through a continuous process of financial deregulation (Edey and Hviding, "An Assessment", 1995; Kregel, "The Past and Future" 1998) . But, as recent financial innovations have been characterised by the advance of securitisation, this deregulation process does not change, but in fact reinforce, the main characteristic of the CMS -the important role of capital market in the process of investment financing.
Private credit systems (PCS) have their typical example in the German economy. In these systems, investment financing is supported, mainly, through long-term loans, sustained by large private banks, which, in turn, are organised as "universal banks". These banks operate with diversified asset and liability structures, reflecting their role in several segments of the financing market (short-and long-term credit and capital markets). In this model, financial system appear concentrated in two different ways: by the reduced range of institutions, prevailing (universal) banks over non-banking institutions; and by the bank's size and market power, which is usually high. Another structural feature of PCS is the smaller role of capital market in the financing process, even for the largest firms, which would have easy access to funds at this market.
Regulation was also important to the formation of PCS, but going in the opposite direction to that of CMS. In the German case, financial regulation was guided by the need to create mechanisms to finance the economic upturn in the two post-war periods (Zysman, Governments, Markets, pp. 251-265; Pozdena and Alexander, "Bank Structure", 1992, pp. 571-575) . In those settings, any area was never prohibited to banks. Even participation or stock control of banks in the non-financial sectors was (and still is) explicitly allowed. This regulation, in part, explains the tendency of the German financial system towards concentration and conglomeration.
Government credit systems (GCS), identified with the French and the Japanese experiences of the post war period, resemble the German model in their instrumental feature. Bank loans are the typical means of financing investment. As for the structure, however, there are important differences. At first, a main feature is the leadership of government institutions in the financing process. Second, these institutions seem organised not only as development banks (supplying funds for the industrial sector) but also under several types of government agencies (implementing specific financial policies). Thus, from a structural viewpoint, the GCS appear more diversified and less concentrated (as to the diversity of institutions) than the PCS, maintaining, however, the conditions of weak capital market and the prevalence of indirect financing.
Operating Conditions of the Models
In spite of operational and structural differences, the three financing models have a common operating condition: the need to attract long-term saving to the financial institutions, in order to enable them to acquire long-term assets. Besides the creation of proper financial instruments, the achievement of this condition depends on the country's capacity to generate aggregate saving and on a favourable environment for its conversion into financial savings, that is, into demand for medium-and long-term assets. Such conditions, in turn, depend on specific features of the financial sector -institutions, instruments and regulation -as well as structural and macroeconomic conditions.
A basic structural determinant of the aggregate saving is the stage of country's economic development: more (less) developed economies, with higher (lower) levels of aggregate and per capita income, are in a more favourable (unfavourable) position to generate aggregate saving.
Another important structural factor is the income distribution profile (Tavares, Da Substituição de Importações, 1979) : its concentration over profits, in detriment of wages, tends to stimulate selffinancing and restrict the access of financial institutions to long-term funds. In such cases, the predominance of self-financing is more a cause than an effect of the weakness of the financing mechanisms. This condition does not per se limit the aggregate saving, but only its conversion into financial savings. However, it is well known that precarious development of long-term financial instruments narrows investment and economic growth rates (Gurley and Shaw, "Financial Aspects", 1955; Shaw, Financial Deepening, 1973; McKinnon, Money and Capital, 1973) . Thus income concentration and the tendency for self-financing end up jeopardising the country's capacity to save.
Among macroeconomic factors, the growth rate is the main influence over the amount of aggregate saving: growing economies, particularly if growth is investment-led, have better conditions to save than those in recession, given that economic growth raises the level of income.
The above analysis suggests that the conditions for development of long-term financing operate in a wicked way, being more difficult to achieve in the less developed economies. The international experience seems to confirm this hypothesis, showing that only in a few cases -USA, England and Germany -private and self-sustainable markets for long-term financial assets were endogenously produced. In all other countries, three alternative ways (isolated or joined) were observed: a) concentration on self-financing; b) concentration on foreign debt; c) creation of public institutions and instruments to support and promote long-term financing. However, the first two alternatives -which prevail in many developing countries up till now -do not mean a solution for the financing problem, but is more closely a result of the lack of it. Thus, in the countries where this "model" prevails there is, at least in theory, potential for spreading out the banking system and/or the capital market.
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCING MODEL IN BRAZIL: FROM THE 1964-67 REFORM TO THE 1980s
The Financing Model Conceived in the 1964-67 Reform
Box 1 summarises the financial structure created by the 1964-67 reform is shown 4 . As shown, the task of providing or intermediating funds to finance investments was ascribed to four types of institutions: the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico), regional development banks, investment banks and brokerage firms.
Although maintaining an important role for the public banks, the 1964-67 reform tried to establish a "private arm" in the Brazilian financial system, to be supported by the capital market, as in the US model. To accomplish this, it was necessary to establish clear market regulation and create conditions of access to long-term funds in the financial market. The market regulations were established in a series of Central Bank Laws and Resolutions, edited during the second half of the 60's. As for long-term saving, the diagnosis guiding the reform was that both saving generation and its allocation were "repressed" in Brazil. Financial repression, in turn, was created by the combination of rising inflation and nominal interest rates limited by the Usury Law (12% a year), leading to low (or negative) real returns, especially for long-term assets 5 . Primary and secondary stock markets.
The inflationary process was fought (without success) with the PAEG (Government Economic Action Plan) -a gradual stabilisation plan, based on fiscal, monetary and wages restriction (Simonsen, Inflação, 1970, pp. 23-56) . The mechanisms created to motivate long-term finance were distinguished by market segments: credit institutions were authorised to issue liabilities with monetary correction clauses ("indexed liabilities"), extending for the private sector a condition already effective for the government securities since July of 1964; for the capital market it was adopted tax exemption for savers and tax reduction for open companies, regulated in 1966 (Lees, Botts e Cysne, Banking Financial, 1990, pp. 242-248) . Finally, the Brazilian economy was additionally opened up to foreign direct investment and loans, in order to increase financial market competition and efficiency.
The BFS After the 1964-67 Reform
Several indicators attest the success of the 1960's reform in broadening and diversifying the BFS (Tables 1, 2 ): a) the number and types of financial institutions increased rapidly; b) bank loans grew as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), showing an increase in the activity of financial intermediation; c) the share of commercial banks in the market of loans was strongly reduced in favour of non-banking institutions, suggesting some progress in the long-term operations. In addition, the extraordinary growth of GDP during the so called "economic miracle"
period and the deepening of the imports-substitution process, promoted by the II PND during the 1974-79 period (Castro and Souza, A Economia Brasileira, 1985; Serra, "Ciclos e Mudanças", 1984) seemed to confirm the effectiveness of the 1960's financial model. Such performance would not have been possible if the previous financial structure had not been changed
As for the modus operandi, however, the BFS did not resemble much the model conceived in the 1964-67 reform: a) the structural diversification, mirrored in the several types of financial institutions, did not correspond, in fact, to the proposed market segmentation, giving place, instead, to a more concentrated bank-centred market structure than that prior to the reform; b) investment banks did not become direct suppliers or mediators of long-term funds, but of working capital; c) long-term deposits did not turn out to be a significant source of funds for private institutions; d) capital market did not become an important way of investment financing: until the end of the 1980's, primary issues of shares and corporate bonds were, in average, inferior to 2,5% of the aggregate investment (Table 4) . Thus, neither in the "economic miracle" nor in the II PND did local capital market or private banks have an important role in financing; instead, investment and growth in these two periods were supported by public (via BNDE) and external loans.
The concentrated structure of the financial market in the 1960s, under the hegemony of commercial banks, hindered the emergence of non-banking independent institutions. Many new institutions established at that time were created or latter incorporated by the existing commercial banks (Tavares, Da Substituição de Importações, . In addition, as shown by Studart (Investment Finance, 1995, pp. 122-123) , government financial policy after the reform was marked by successive loosening of the legislation. That policy further contributed to banking concentration, by particularly strengthening the investment banks. The basic financing source of these banks would be long-term indexed liabilities, issued both in the domestic and foreign markets -the later backed by Central Bank Resolution 63. But, as domestic issues became difficult, the government gradually gave way to the pressures of investment banks, allowing them to issue short-term liabilities.
As the investment banks' liability became shorter, equal trend was observed in the asset side. Thus, investment banks started to operate in the same market segment of the finance companies: these banks counted on equal funding conditions in the domestic market, but had the advantage of accessing foreign funds (cheaper than the domestic ones) through the "63 operations".
Only commercial banks, which also had access to these external operations (besides the exclusiveness of cash deposits), were able to compete with investment banks. Therefore, following the 1964-67 reform, there was a process of banking concentration, which gave place to the formation of financial conglomerates. These organisations brought together several types of financial institutions, under the leadership of a commercial or an investment bank (Lees, Botts and Cysne, Banking Financial, .
In the stock market, the fiscal incentives produced a boom, guided by the short-term financial advantages (from the tax exemptions) and not by accurate prospective analyses. By the end of 1971, it culminated with the crash of the Stock Exchange and drained the market for two decades. During the 1970s, the relation between traded values in the secondary and primary segments increased rapidly (Table 4) As previously mentioned, the diagnosis guiding the reform stressed the importance of the real rate of return on assets. Coupled with the government option for a gradualist price stabilisation, this approach determined the emphasis of the reform in measures aiming to augment nominal rates of assets return -this was the role of the monetary correction and fiscal incentives. Considering the return per unit of time, however, monetary correction rewarded equally short-and long-term investments. Thus, in practice, there was no advantage in holding long-term bonds.
Moreover, monetary correction may only be an efficient mechanism to protect real income under moderate and steady inflation rates that allow time for waiting the monetary earnings without significant income losses. This, however, was not the case in Brazil Brazilian in the period that followed the reform, especially after 1974. Facing a volatile inflation environment, short-term indexed assets attracted savers, but not the financial institutions, which would have their liabilities indexed to variable and unpredictable indexes. Pre-fixed monetary correction, which prevailed for some assets (Lemgruber, Uma Análise Quantitativa, 1978, pp.38-41) , was also unable to boost savings: given the unstable inflation, this kind of assets would imply a real income loss, if actual inflation surpassed the pre-fixed monetary correction -which was not an uncommon fact in Brazil.
The Brazilian Banking Strategy in the 80's
Strengthening of private banks along the 1970s did not result, as it could have been the case, in the formation of a private credit system in Brazil. Barriers to long-term investments were dramatically accentuated in the 1980s by the context of deep macroeconomic disequilibrium, shaped by: a) a rigid external restraint, due to two oil crises (in 1973 and 1979) , followed by rising interest rates in the USA; b) the high Brazilian foreign debt, mostly owed by the federal government; c) an acute fiscal deterioration; d) the galloping inflation; e) several failed stabilisation attempts. On the one hand, these conditions determined an erratic macroeconomic performance and an extremely unfavourable environment for investment and indebtedness. In such a context, selffinancing, feasible by rising "mark up", became predominant among non-financial firms and strongly reduced business opportunities for the financial system (Almeida, "Instabilidade da Economia", 1988; Studart, Investment Finance, pp. 85-86) 6 .
On the other hand, the public sector financial restraints created a profitable short-term business opportunity for the banking system. The slowdown of the economy penalised tax receipts, and generated systematic budget deficits. Thus, besides a high foreign debt, the federal government also accumulated a growing internal debt. To roll it over, in a context of accelerated inflation, the government was gradually forced to accept worse financing conditions -that is, short-term liabilities with increasing (nominal) interest rates. In this scenario, the "automatic zeroing" mechanism was created: through it BACEN repurchased public bonds "in excess" at banks' portfolio, thus eliminating their eventual reserve deficits.
Under the "zeroing" mechanism, the acquisition of government securities became a profitable and practically risk-free business for banks. They, in turn, used these securities to avoid deposit losses ("money flight") that usually happen in economies under high inflation rates and lead to banking crisis. Along the 1980s, the Brazilian banks developed many kinds of indexed deposits, maintaining their attractiveness for the savers, whom, in turn, financed the banks' acquisitions of short-term public bonds. Furthermore, as inflation accelerated, nominal interest rates were gradually being "indexed" to expected inflation -and no longer to past inflation. This condition kept the banks more protected against inflationary risk than they were in the 1970s.
The macroeconomic instability in Brazil during the 1980s explains some important features of the banks' strategy in this period, reflected in the changes in their asset composition (Tables 5.A to 5.C; Fundap, "Evolução e Impasses do Crédito", 1988; Fundap, "Estratégias e Padrão de
Rentabilidade", 1993): a) the increase in the share of short-term public bonds; b) the reduction of credit operations; c) high investments in payment system technology, aiming to reduce operational costs and maximise inflationary revenues (from the "zeroing" mechanism); d) the "outside" diversification, that is, towards non-financial sectors -these last two items evidenced by the increase of fixed to total asset ratio. (Table 7) 7 .
The ownership relations between the great banks and non-financial companies contributed to increase the size and the practice of self-financing, reinforcing, consequently, enhanced the trend towards financial desintermediation. 8 Thus, in Brazil, unlike more developed financial systems, the desintermediation process did not result in expansion of the stock market, but of the self-financing.
THE BFS IN THE NINETIES (1990-97)
The New Macroeconomic and Institutional Environment
The first half of the 1990s brought up important changes to Brazilian economy. At first, this In Brazil, external restraint began to be eased in 1992, when a new foreign debt agreement was signed (after several unsuccessful attempts) under the "Brady Plan" rules. In the same year, two another factors contributed for recovering the foreign investors' trust and interest in the Brazilian economy: a) the impeachment of President Fernando Collor, which ended the political and economic impasse that marked the country during his mandate (started in 1990); b) the adoption of an orthodox macroeconomic policy, ruled by high real interest rates, daily exchange rate devaluations, tax increases and a rigid control of public expenditure. In 1994, a new foreign debt agreement (also under the "Brady Plan") and the price stabilisation accomplished by the "Real Plan", an "exchange-rate based" stabilization program, gave new impetus for capital inflows.
At the institutional level, in 1987 a process of financial liberalisation began in Brazil. Like in other developing countries, it was guided to the opening and deregulation of financial sector.
Concerning the opening policy, the most important measures were (Andima, Brazil for Foreign, 1998a, pp. 117-118 
The New Conditions and the BFS
In general, the macroeconomic and institutional conditions in the 1990s were favourable to financial activity in Brazil: a) the access of financial and non-financial institutions to foreign capital was recovered; b) economic activity was retaken and, in 1993, investment rates began recovering (Table 3) ; c) credit operations were revitalised, because of the economic upturn and the price stability; d) the capital market was stimulated, rising the ratio of primary issues to capital formation and reducing the burden of purely speculative operations in the secondary market (Table 4) .
The banking system
The effects of the new macroeconomic and institutional context on the Brazilian banking system may be seen through the changes in its asset and liability structures during the nineties (Tables 5 and 6 ).
In the multiple banks, the main changes in asset composition until 1997 were the decline of the share of government securities and the increase in credit and external operations. 9 On the liability side, the most visible change was the rise in the share of time deposits, foreign bonds and exchange operations. All these changes were deeper in the private multiple banks than in the public ones, reflecting the higher degree of autonomy in the former.
Commercial banks, investment banks and BNDES (it gained an "S" for Social in 1982)
showed important differences in relation to multiple banks. In the commercial banks' asset structure, the only significant change was the increase in the share of external operations -also led by private banks. Public bonds fell modestly and credit operations loss participation in the asset structure of these banks. Such changes suggest that commercial banks are becoming more skilled in the intermediation of foreign funds. This hypothesis is reinforced by the analysis of their liability structure, where the only items showing significant changes were linked to external sector as well.
Investment banks showed similar trends to commercial banks, reducing credit operations and rising only operations linked to foreign sector, both on the asset and liability sides.
BNDES, as a state development bank, operates more in line with the objectives of the economic and financial policies than with market conditions. This pattern justifies that the changes in its asset and liability structure have showed trends which are distinct from that observed in other banks -even in the multiple banks, which are the main BNDES' potential competitors in the longterm credit market. Only the shares of private securities and of fixed asset ratios showed significant changes in BNDES' asset structure in the nineties. Credit operations underwent a relative fall in the 1989-94 period, recovering after 1995, but without returning at the (higher) levels of the eighties.
It is worth noting that the reduction of BNDES' credit was not characteristic of the nineties, but a clear long-term trend, which has been accentuated since the beginning of the eighties. Coupled with other changes in the asset structure, this trend might just as well indicate a new Bank's operation strategy, towards desintermediation. This being the case, the fall in its traditional loans would be offset, at least in part, by an increase in the share of the private securities. Most important of all, BNDES' total asset would probably stabilise or even grow in the period. However, BNDES' asset ratio to aggregate asset of the four main financing institutions here analysed was considerably reduced in the nineties, from an average of 24,8% in the 1974-88 period to 15,2% in 1989-97. Thus, besides a new strategy, the changes in its asset structure pointed to an effective fall in the Bank's contribution to investment financing in Brazil.
The reduction of BNDES' contribution to the financing of capital formation in Brazil reflects the shift on the government's attitude over the economy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has defended the "minimum state" model. Such a posture is also reflected in BNDES liability structure, that shows a constant reduction in "public power obligations". This loss of fiscal funds was not offset by other "external" sources, but by own capital, that passed from 18,5% in 1987-88
to 33,9% in 1993-94 and 27,4% in 1995-97. The increasing importance of self-financing for BNDES, probably explains a good deal of the reduction of its role in investment financing, as well as the mentioned change in its operation strategy. While the access to third party funds is hindered, either because the shortage of these funds or because the Bank's preference for a more conservative management, its capacity to expand credit supply, as well as the bank's profitability, becomes increasingly constrained (Minsky, Stabilizing, 1986, pp. 234-238) . In this environment, "securitised" assets are favoured, not only because they represent a business alternative, but also for their strategic advantages: they do not commit the bank's own capital (except for a short time, in "unmatched" operations) and allow higher flexibility and liquidity to the bank than conventional loans 10 .
The same rationale possibly applies to the decline of share of credit operations in the investment banks' asset structure, as their own capital ratios in the nineties were similar to BNDES' level (around 30%). By comparison, it is worth noting that the share of this item on investment banks' and BNDES' funding sources during the 1990s was practically twice of that observed in multiple banks -the only banking sector that substantially increased credit operations. Furthermore, multiple banks have widened their asset ratio to aggregate asset of the focused institutions, suggesting that its credit ratio growth also meant an increase in its market share. The highest leverage ratio of these banks -that is, its assets to equity ratio -certainly, is one of the reasons behind this result.
Still concerning credit operations, it is important to mention that, until 1997, the recovery was led by short-term operations. The only groups that gained share in total loans were individual consumers and the commerce activity (Table 9) , whose credit demand are concentrated in terms lower than one year. Sectors that usually demand long-term financing (such as industry and housing) had their market share unaffected. Another indicator of (and reason for) the observed weak propensity of Brazilian banking system for long-term operations emerged from its liability structure. The similarity between multiple and commercial banks in what concerns time deposits ratios is striking: it was 21,2%, on average, in the multiple banks (between 1992-97) , that are supposed to operate with longer maturities, and 20,7% in the commercial banks, which usually operate with short-term businesses. Furthermore, the solid increase of foreign funds in the banks' liability structure in Brazil occurred, almost exclusively, because of short-term funds, while the share of long-term funds shank slightly in all analysed institutions.
Investment funds, pension funds and the capital market
A recent trend in BFS, which is not observable in bank balance sheets, is the emergence and growth of mutual investment and pension funds. These institutions have been important to the development of capital markets in several countries, because their assets are largely composed of long-term fixed-and floating-income securities.
Investment funds were first regulated in Brazil in the beginning of the nineties, in order to ease the rolling over of the high public debt, in the context of high inflation. Through these funds, banks bought indexed government securities and funded them by issuing short-term indexed deposits, offered to the public. Such deposits were easily accepted by savers, because, in practice, these deposits were very similar to demand deposits. In July 1995, CMN determined several changes in the sector regulation, establishing high reserve requirements of short-term asset holdings by these funds, and stimulating longer-term operations with low or null reserve requirements. At the time, the fixed-income Financial Investment Funds (FIF) were created (and are in effect until today) under four distinct maturity structure: FIF 30, FIF 60 and FIF 90, respectively with minimum 30, 60
and 90 days-term, and the Short-Term FIF, without a legal minimum term. Another indication in the same direction was the recent expansion of mutual equity funds: by middle 1996, they represented only 3% of the whole funds market (BACEN, Boletim Mensal, 1996) , whereas this share rises to 11% in 1997. In contrast, however, two factors suggest that this progress in the savings allocation pattern still goes at a slow pace: a) the small share of the FIF 90, which represents only 2% of the total assets of the funds industry, although, like FIF 60, it benefits from the exemption of compulsory reserves; b) the portfolio composition of the longer term funds, which is still strongly concentrated in assets of high liquidity -particularly, federal public bonds.
Like mutual investment funds, pension funds had a vigorous growth in Brazil in the last few years (Table 12) , specially the "closed entities". 11 By the end of 1997, they held assets up to US$ 78 billions, with approximately 43% of them applied in floating-income securities. The remaining 57%
were short-term assets (public bonds, banking deposits, etc.) and real estate market.
Another source of funds to Brazilian capital market in the nineties was foreign investments, regulated by "Annex IV". Following the general trend of capital flows to the country, there was a rapid rise of the operations under Annex IV, reaching an annual average greater than US$ 40 billions between 1993-95 (Table 8) . From then on, these investments have lost a bit of the brightness they had in the first years of the Brazilian financial opening: the annual average fell to US$ 27 billions in 1996-97 and the investments acquired a more speculative and volatile profile.
Investment funds, pension funds and foreign resources from Annex IV boosted the Brazilian stock market in the nineties, and moderately began to change the investment profile. The increase in the ratios between issues and capital formation, and between issues and value traded in the secondary market (Table 4 , columns 3 and 4) indicates some strengthening of the role of the capital market in the process of investment financing in Brazil.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW FINANCING MODEL IN BRAZIL
Structural Conditions: the inheritance of the 1980s
Today, the BFS is formed by all financial institutions listed on Box 1, with two exceptions: a) the exclusion of BNH (National Housing Bank), which was extinct in 1986, having its functions taken over by CEF (Federal Savings Bank); b) the inclusion of multiple banks, from 1988 on. From a structural standpoint, the BFS may be now characterised as a bank-based system given that loan institutions comprise 94% of the sector's asset (Table 11 ). Due to its successful performance against the unstable macroeconomic environment during the 1980's, the Brazilian banking system is a solid one today.
In mid-1995, short after the Mexican currency crisis, BACEN rose the interest rate significantly, devaluated the exchange rate (at about 6%) and changed the exchange regime, from a fixed-exchange one to a band system. At this time, the Brazilian banking sector had increasing nonperforming debt ratios and went through a "liquidity crisis". However, as Carvalho has shown (Carvalho, "The Real Stabilization Plan", 1998), this setback has not turned into a systemic banking crisis. The problem was promptly set on by BACEN, through conventional "last resort" loans (to those banks which were short of liquidity) and implementing measures to support the restructuring of the sector. The restructuring measures were based on the liquidation of the troubled banks and on the PROER (Banking System Restructuring and Enhancing Programme). PROER consisted in
Central Bank loans, funded by resources from the bank compulsory reserves, which were offered to solid banks interested in acquiring the troubled ones. In fact, Central Bank strategy was capable of allowing that banking distress had a minimum effect on the economic activity (Table 3 ). This result would not have been achieved if the crisis' target had been a fragile banking system.
Despite the solid banking structure, the BFS may not be characterised as a Private Credit System. Even for multiple banks, credit operations represent less than half of its total assets, though these loans have had relative rapid growth in the last decade. Furthermore, the analysis of the 1990-97 period, shows evident signs of persistence of the "short-termist" profile of savings, and hence, of the difficulties for developing long-term financing, which has always marked the Brazilian banking system. This pattern also explains the lack of significant development in the capital market, which, up to 1997, was a secondary source of investment financing in Brazil.
Under such conditions, the perspectives of development of long-term financial mechanisms in the country -either through the banking or the capital market -are tied to the implementation of a financial policy, capable to break through the vicious circle, developed in the last years, between financial restrictions and weak economic growth in Brazil.
The discussion about what ought to be such a policy is extensive and complex enough to deserve a separate study. Nevertheless, the Brazilian case, in light of the international theory and experience, provides some basic criteria for drafting it. Section 5.2 presents some suggestions and comments on recent government measures in this area.
The Role of Financial Policy
The main goal of economic policies, in any area, is to increment the efficiency of the sector targeted. Confronted by its functions and peculiar risks, the efficiency of financial sector can not be defined only by microeconomic indicators (volume and costs of funds mobilised), but also, and mainly, by the macroeconomic effects of its functioning. The goal of financial policy, therefore, is to achieve a first-or second-best balance between the degrees of resources mobility and security of the financial system as a whole. The concept of functionality proposed by Studart (Investment Resolution 2689 eliminated the "Annexes" that had defined different market segments for foreigners' investments in Brazil. Now, the new regulation allows free resources transfer among the different segments -from stock market to fixed-income funds, for instance. Moreover, CVM's bureaucratic procedures to authorise foreigners' investments were substituted for a simple document of investment statement. By this change, foreigners' investment is, now, permitted in only two days, while the former procedure took until two months to be completed.
Deepening the opening of the financial market, however, is a risky process, that should be carefully managed in order to avoid a high external fragility. The experience of currency crisis in Mexico (1994), Southeast Asia (1997) and Brazil (1998-99) are dramatic examples of such risk.
Thus, the external financing should be seen as a complement for the potential expansion based on domestic saving. This source of financing, in turn, should be preferably channelled through investment and pension fund holdings of medium-and long-term banking deposits. In more developed countries and financial systems these financial instruments are the main ways of expanding and supporting long-term banking credit and capital markets.
As for the pension funds, there is little room for increasing its contribution to the Brazilian capital market in the short-term. In 1997, the closed funds already allocated 43% of its resources in shares and debentures (32% directly and 11% through investment funds - Table 12 ). This fraction is very close to the maximum of 50% allowed for these types of securities by the Central Bank Resolution 2324/1996, which regulates the pension funds investments of its technical reserves. In the same year, investments in fixed-income securities represented 31% of the funds portfolio, for a maximum permitted limit of 80%. However, as fixed-income assets in Brazil still have short maturities, the expansion of this permitted limit does not necessarily mean an increase of the functionality of pension funds.
The pension funds associations claim that changes in legislation are needed to increment their contribution to the process of economic development. Their main demand is for the loosening or extinction of the limits for investment of technical reserves in specific financial instruments.
However, considering the risks that could affect both pension funds and its participants, this measure does not seem to be the best strategy. It is worth mentioning that Resolution 2324/1996 was a government reaction to the financial losses incurred by several private pension funds in the stock market in 1995 because the Mexican currency crisis (Pereira, Miranda e Silva, "Os Fundos de 1997) . Moreover, as any other investor, the demand of the pension funds for floatingincome assets is guided by their expectations of profits and risks of the issuing companies, which will not be affected for eventual changes in the legislation. Lastly, the fact that their investments in these assets are below the permitted limit, reveals that the legal limit has not been an obstacle to the actuation of these institutions in the Brazilian capital market.
The expansion of the aggregate portfolio of private security institutions in Brazil is, therefore, the healthier way to raise their functionality in the BFS. Despite significant expansion of the sector in the nineties, concerning the number of institutions and in the amount of resources mobilised, the number of contributors has remained the same (around 1,700) since 1991. The growth of the sector's aggregate portfolio in the period has been only due to the positive profitability of their assets -a condition that indicates an uncertain situation in the future.
Moreover, the amount of beneficiaries and fixed expenditures of the institutions has been growing since the beginning of the decade. Thus, a policy to incentive the admission of new contributors is increasingly needed for the financial and actuarial equilibrium of the Brazilian pension funds in the medium-term.
It is possible that the ongoing Social Security reform, signalling the reduction of benefits for the future retired generations, would stimulate the demand for private security. However, facing the Brazilian savers' inexperience in long-term saving, this possibility will be, largely, wasted, in the absence of conditions to facilitate, or even to stimulate, the allocation of savings to this channel. Concerning the investment funds, the concentration of their portfolio on assets characterised by high liquidity does not place them in position of sustaining a capital market that can be functional to the economic development. The point is that, in Brazil, unlike what is observed in developed countries (Studart, "Securitização", 1998) , the investment funds are still seen by the savers and by the managers institutions as a short-term alternative in the market -perhaps due to the inflationary environment within which these funds were developed and became popular.
The causes that restrain the lengthening of the investment funds portfolio in Brazil are essentially the same that have been limiting the investment and multiple banks' interest in long-term operations -even because, in Brazil, the majority of these funds is managed by financial conglomerates (Hermann e Studart, "Estrutura e Operação", 1999). Despite the success of the Real Plan in the field of price stabilisation (Andima, "Quatro Anos", 1998b) , several factors have contributed in the last years to keep the concentration of the BFS in short-term assets, and particularly, in public securities: a) the growth of budget deficits (Table 3) ; b) the Central Bank need to sell federal debt to "sterilise" the increased international reserves, in order to control monetary supply in phases of high capital inflow (between 1995 and 1997) ; c) the policy of high interest rates, particularly in the period 1997-99, intending to control aggregate demand, inflation and, above all, to finance the current account deficits, in a situation of global economic slowdown; d) the weak GDP growth since 1996, due to interest rate policy and, from 1997 on, to foreign restriction as well; e) the increase in the risk level of banking system and investment funds. The credit risk tends to increase in this context because of the high interest rates and the weakness of economic activity; the interest risk also rises, since interest rates could be changed suddenly to adjust the economy; and, from 1999 on, the currency risk has widened, with the establishment of the flexible exchange regimen.
Under such conditions, savers, banks and funds managers tend to adopt, formal or informally, a "credit rationing" policy. The rationing is characterised when higher (real) interest rates are no longer able to stimulate the demand for assets, because, besides the expected return, it expands more than proportionally the (expected) asset risk (Stiglitz e Weiss, "Credit Rationing", 1981) . In the Brazilian case, in addition to the risks related to the high interest rates, credit rationing also reflects the typical high degree of risk-aversion of savers and financial institutions in Brazil, produced by the long history of macroeconomic instability -particularly, due to the context of persisting fiscal disequilibrium and external vulnerability.
In this context, the task of building an environment of trust, capable to stimulate the demand for long-term assets, requires government actions in three areas. The first of them relates to the macroeconomic policy: it is necessary to lower interest rates to levels which would allow the reduction of public and private sectors' credit risk, so indirectly stimulating the investment recovery. The second area is the financial policy, where the main tasks are the revision and strengthening of the prudential regulation, aimed at controlling bank and capital market risks. This is important because, as it is widely known, these risks have increased in all countries submitted to a financial liberalisation process and still more in those, like Brazil, that coupled this process with a price stabilisation plan (Carvalho, "The Real Stabilization Plan").
Prudential regulation assures a gradual reduction of the financial system's risk, but not the rising of expected returns, especially for long-term assets. This rising will only happen because of an actual sustained growth of the real income. Such a growth, in turn, depends on the availability of long-term financing. Financial restraint, therefore, creates a vicious circle, which will be very difficult to break, without the support of public credit -at least, for starting the process of economic growth. Thus, such a policy is also required for the construction of a functional financial market, as evidenced by the experiences of the more industrialised economies.
The required interest rate policy involves two levels of government action: on the basic (primary) interest rate (here represented by the SELIC rate) and on the banking spread. As for the first step, Central Bank freedom to act is constrained by the macroeconomic goals of price stability and external equilibrium. These goals restrict the scope for lowering interest rates in any country and even more in those submitted to an exchange-anchor regime (Hermann, "Ancoragem Cambial", 1999) , like Brazil between 1994-98. From 1999 on, the exchange-anchor has been substituted by a flexible exchange regime, which, in theory (using Mundell-Fleming model), gives more freedom to BACEN in the management of monetary policy. However, the international experience has shown that, in fact, this freedom is really achieved only when the exchange rate has been stabilised, no longer pressuring the inflation rate. More than that, what is necessary is a solid exchange-rate stabilisation, based, essentially, on the country's capacity to generate positive trade balances, and not on foreign debt. In this vein, considering that Brazil seems still far from accomplish this condition, it can be said that BACEN has been using its limited degree of freedom insofar as possible, having reduced the SELIC rate from 45% to 16,5% a year between the first quarter of inflation around 7% (by CPI).
As for the banking spread, it reflects three components: a) the risk rate attributed to each specific asset; b) the macroeconomic risk, associated to the GDP growth rates and to some indicators of monetary and credit markets (basically, the inflation, exchange, and interest rates and bankruptcy indicators); c) regulatory features, such as taxes, compulsory reserves and other requirements that imply costs for financial institutions. The first component is not under direct control of the macroeconomic and financial policies; the second reflects the conditionings and limits of the macroeconomic policy, as previously noted; then, only the latter is liable to direct intervention by government.
Based on a Central Bank recent study (BACEN, Juros e Spread, 1999) , the government has been adopting an incentive policy aiming at the reduction of banking spreads, by reducing taxes and compulsory reserves imposed over banking operations: a) the IOF (financial operations tax) over credit operations fell from 6% to 1,5%; b) reserve requirements over sight deposits were reduced from 75% to 45%; c) reserve requirements were eliminated for banking time deposits and for investment funds operations. Besides, the government has been trying to stimulate competition in the banking sector by disclosing information about the interest rates charged by individual banks, and through a policy for increasing foreign participation in the Brazilian banking market. To do that, the government has supplied credit and fiscal incentives to foreign banks interested in the acquisition of troubled national ones (Barros e Almeida Jr., Análise do Ajuste, 1997) . As the operation of foreign banks in Brazil has not been regulated yet, at the legal step, this policy is being rested on the Presidential sanction.
The market share of foreign banks in Brazil has been growing at a faster rate, since 1996 (Andima, "Reestruturação do SFN", 1997; Carvalho, "New Competitive", 2000) . These banks enter the Brazilian market with better conditions of access to foreign funds, because their reputation and investment rating in the international financial market are, in general, higher than those of national banks. In addition, foreign banks have easy access to local bank's customers and low (fixed) initial costs because, in most cases, they enter in the Brazilian market through mergers or acquisitions of already established institutions. Hence, foreign institutions can charge smaller loan rates and, through competition, can force domestic rates down.
Besides this favourable "competition-effect", the growth of foreign participation within the Brazilian banking system will surely affect the sector market structure, but not yet in a very clear way. Foreign banks will, probably, taken up a significant share of the credit market, especially in the medium-and long-term segments. In addition to the lowest operational costs of foreign banks, the inexperience of Brazilian banks in these segments -which require a more technical and rigorous process of risk evaluation than short-term operations -is another advantage for foreign banks. Thus, the financial opening has forced the banking system to a new round of market concentration. This process has been headed by foreign banks and national financial conglomerates -the same institutions that led the mergers and acquisitions operations after the banking liquidity problems of 1995. In the short-term, the competition among these strong financial institutions will probably lead to lower interest rates for the final borrower. In the medium-and long-term, however, the consequences of this process are still difficult to judge. The new market structure will certainly be more concentrated than the present one, thus, paving the way for the return of the practice of high banking spreads.
Concerning the risks of the banking system, several measures of prudential control were implemented in the last years (Hermann e Studart, "Estrutura e Operação"). In the capital market, in addition to the already mentioned private security reform, BACEN has settled and standardised financial reports by the investment funds; has begun to require written information about the risks on this operations; and has established punishments for the funds managers, in case of irregularities. These measures were introduced in order to improve the disclosure to individual savers of the return and risk conditions of pension and investment funds.
Also, a new Corporation Law has been appraised in the Congress, focusing in the guarantees of similar rights for controllers and minority shareholders (underprivileged in the present-day law of 1976). It intends to stimulate the participation of the latter in the market (CVM, "Por Dentro da Lei", 2000) .
Finally, in the public credit area, BNDES is the key institution in the structure of the BFS. It is the only national bank with recognised know-how in the provision of long-term financing for the industrial and infrastructure sectors. However, between 1997 and 1999 the Bank's loans budget was maintained in R$ 18 billion per year, thus "shrinking" in real terms, since that in the same period the accumulated inflation was 28,96%. Such a policy reflects mostly BNDES' adjustment to the external restraint imposed to all financial and non-financial companies in the country, due to the Asian, Russian and Brazilian recent currency crises. Moreover, it also reflects the liberal "minimum state" approach followed by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Thus, even after the external restraint had been removed, it cannot be expected a significant contribution of BNDES to long-term financing in Brazil.
In the first semester of 2000, President Cardoso signalled a shift in the government posture, favouring the economic development. In this model, in principle, GDP growth and employment will be priorities, gaining a status equivalent to that of price stabilisation within the macroeconomic goals. This new government's vision was reflected in BNDES' loans budget, which jumped to R$ 24 billion in 2000. However, it is well known that such agenda has meet some resistance in the President's team, especially from the Minister of Finance, who has strongly influenced President Cardoso since his first mandate. Thus, it would be precipitate to interpret this recent announcement as "the" new public credit policy of the Brazilian government.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article analysed the organisation and financing experience of the BFS from the reform of the 1960s to the nineties. It was also evaluated the perspectives of development of a (new) financing model in Brazil, led by the national saving and the private financial institutions.
At first, it was shown that the 1964-67 financial reform was successful in expanding and diversifying the BFS. However, under inadequate institutional (regulatory) and macroeconomic conditions, only short-term operations and the demand for public bonds were, in fact, stimulated.
Therefore, it can be said that the reform failed in its main goal, that is, to create a private system of long-term financing in Brazil.
Until the end of the 1980s, the Brazilian financing model did not resemble any other known private system -the capital market or the private credit system. During that period, the State was kept as the only domestic supplier of long-term credit, through BNDES and also from other less conventional budget sources 13 . Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to define the BFS of the 1970-80s as a public credit system, given the importance that external credit and self-financing had in this period and have until today. Albeit significant as part of an economic development policy, BNDES' contribution to capital formation in Brazil was relatively modest in quantitative terms: according to BNDES' own estimations, even during the II PND period, which represented the peak of the Bank's actuation in investment financing, this contribution reached only 8,7% (Monteiro Filha, "A Contribuição do BNDES", 1995, p. 155 ).
An important progress that should be emphasised in the public credit policy, as compared with the financing model before the 1960s, is the endowment of non-monetary and non-budgeting sources of funds for BNDES. Gradually, the Bank gained more autonomy in the administration of its financial policy, which was sustained by several special funds and compulsory savings mechanisms (Prochnik, "Fontes de Recursos", 1995) .
By the end of the 1980s, the country has begun a process of financial liberalisation ruled by a gradual deregulation of the banking system -defined in the 1988 banking reform -and by the capital market opening. Coupled with this process, increased liquidity in the international market upturned the voluntary capital flow to the country in the first half of the 1990s, giving back to the BFS an important source of funds, which had been missed in the previous decade. From 1994 on, the monetary stabilisation has also contributed to widen business opportunities in the BFS, by recovering the credit demand, which was retreated during the long period of high inflation.
The 1988 banking reform meant a radical breaking with the financial model idealised in the 1960s -a segmented system, based on the capital market -and towards the German model -a private credit system, led by "universal banks". The relative financial equilibrium demonstrated by the large Brazilian banks -which have resisted to the long period of high inflation and, more recently, to the currency crisis -reinforces the perspectives of a financial development in this direction. However, to classify the BFS of the 1990s as a private credit system would be precipitate.
The viability of this financing model, as well as of the other two models here mentioned, does not only require compatible conditions in the institutional and structural fronts, but also return and risk conditions favourable to long-term operations. The weakness of the Brazilian economy concerning these conditions still acts as a limit to the formation of a solid long-term segment in the BFS, either in the banking sector or in the capital market. Despite the positive factors of the 1990s, what has happened in this decade is a movement of credit expansion that was still concentrated in short-term operations for the private sector and, since 1997, for the public sector.
For the 1990 decade, the analysis suggests that the weak interest of banks and investment funds in long-term financial operations cannot be attributed to regulatory restrictions. The 1995 legislation for the funds, as well as the 1988 Reform for the banks, are very liberal relative to their resources allocation rules. In fact, the recent Asian and Russian crises and its effects to the Brazilian financial market showed that the liberalisation policy had gone too far, signalling the need of a prudential regulation to limit the exposition of financial institutions -and, hence, of individual savers -to the risks of a liberalised market. The draft of such a regulation has been the main task of President Cardoso's financial policy in the last years of the 1990s.
In short, the main obstacle to the development of long-term financing mechanisms in Brazil is not the financial regulation, but the environment of uncertainty and risk aversion that still dominates the Brazilian asset market. The price stabilisation and financial liberalisation policies were clearly insufficient to revert this situation, changing only the set of conditions that justify it.
Until the 1980s, it was formed by the combination of high inflation, high short-term public debt, and external restraint. Now these conditions are: a) the weakness of economic activity as it restricts the aggregate income, keeping the credit risk high; b) the latent external restraint imposed by the financial liberalisation model: by combining a flexible exchange rate regime with high capital mobility, the economy remains under permanent risk (although with variable degrees) of unstable exchange rates and, then, of inflation. Moreover, this environment tends to raise the risk of changes in interest rates and, consequently, the liquidity risk of the banking system.
The breaking of this vicious circle requires a combination of macroeconomic and financial policies, involving three lines of action: a) a consistent reduction of interest rates; b) the reinforcement of the mechanisms of prudential control for financial risks; c) a public credit support, in order to make viable the new investment plans (supposedly stimulated by the other measures), in an environment traditionally conditioned by low expected returns and high risk in long-term financial operations. As shown, the Brazilian government's strategy in the last years has been oriented by the two first alternatives, more strongly by the second one. In contrast public credit policy until 2000 followed the tendency of retraction, initiated in the 1980s.
Under the hypothesis that the liberal vision prevails the role of public credit will tend to shrink still more in the next years. In this case, a new investment cycle will have to be sustained by a combination of private domestic credit (as possible), foreign funds and self-financing. The eventual concentration of the investment financing in foreign funds imply the risk of the country's financial and exchange fragility. Concentration in self-financing tends to increase the "mark ups"
and, hence, the prices and the inflation associated by GDP growth. Therefore, if the policies in course do not succeed in the task of building a private credit system in Brazil, financial stability and/or the investment and growth rates will be threatened.
NOTES
1 This paper was developed as part of the Money and Financial System Studies Group, within the Institute of Economics of Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IE / UFRJ). The author thanks Rogerio Studart for the thorough discussion of the first version of the paper and the referee for the comments and suggestions, exempting them of any responsibility for eventual mistakes and omissions. 2 In the US experience, the specialisation did not happen spontaneously, but as a result of the regulation imposed in the 1930s, aiming at the financial system's security, through disciplining the sector competition (Baer and Motte, "The United States", 1992; Zysman, Governments, Markets, pp. 266-281; Cargill, Money, The Financial System, 1983, pp.188-221) . In the English case, although specialisation has been spontaneously developed, it was also clearly stimulated by the financial regulation (Llewellyn, "Competition, Diversification", 1992) . 3 This positive relationship between saving propensity and economic income has been suggested by Keynes (Keynes, A Teoria Geral, 1985, pp. 75-76) . 4 For a detailed description of the measures and laws of the 1964-67 financial reforms in Brazil, see Lemgruber (Uma Analise Quantitativa, 1978, pp. 26-31) and Montoro Filho (Moeda e Sistema Financeiro no Brasil, 1982, pp. 88-93 and 106-108) . For a more analytical approach of the reform, see Tavares (Da Substituição de Importações, and the interesting work of Studart (Investment Finance, 1995, Ch. 2-3 and 8) . 5 For an excellent theoretical discussion on that issue, see Studart, Investment Finance, 1995, Ch. 2-3 and 8. 6 In 1984 self-financing rose to 76,8% of the funds used by national private companies and 87,7% for the foreign private ones; in 1978, these percentages were, respectively, 58,8% and 76,7% (Lees, Bott and Cysne, Banking Financial, p. 330) . Only state companies, whose self-financing capacity was eroded by their high foreign debt, coupled with the international interest rate shock and the government policy of price controls (as part of the anti-inflationary policy), raised the use of third parties funds in this phase, reducing the selffinancing from 50,7% in 1978 to 40,4% in 1984. 7 It is interesting to note that the actuation in non-financial sector is an exclusive trait of national companies, especially the private ones. This trend probably reflects the differences between national and foreign banks concerning their regulation pattern and market strategies. 8 The banks' investments in their own enterprises are recorded as "fixed assets", and not as "credit operations". For the companies, in a similar way, this operation affects the "net worth" and not the degree of indebtedness. 9 The analysis of the banking system in the 1990-97 period is limited to the first semester of 1997, trying to avoid data "contamination" through the effects of the Southeast Asia financial crisis, that initiated in July of the same year and affected financial market in several other countries, including Brazil. 10 About the advantages of securitizing loans in the banks asset, see Santos, "Commercial Banks", 1998 . About the experience of American and European banks in this direction, see Kregel, "The Past and Future", 1998, and Edey and Hviding, "An Assessment", 1995. 11 "Closed" pension funds are those maintained exclusively by employees and capital of a specific company. This type of pension fund is dominant in Brazil, while the "open" entities (those maintained for individual contributors are still little active: their aggregate asset represent less than 10% of that of "closed" funds, which was estimated in US$ 77,8 billion in the end of 1997 (Anapp, Mercado de Previdência, 1988 Abrapp, "Informações Estatísticas", 1998) . 12 In these cases, in addition to the risks associated to the rapid expansion of credit flows, liquidity problems may occur in the banking system, resulting from the loss of inflationary revenues. 13 For more details, see Lees, Botts and Cysne, Banking Financial, Cap. 11, and Studart, Investment Finance, . ,8 -12,6 0,3 -6,4 1974-80 6,9 23,7 51,8 31,0 -13,7 7,5 17,2 -53,8 5,3 -6,9 1981-83 -2,2 19,6 129,7 129,8 0,0 6,1 61,4 -81,3 7,5 -4,6 1984-86 6,9 17,2 161,6 181,1 7,4 3,8 91,1 -101,7 12,0 -6,8 1987-92 0,3 15,9 940,8 995,7 5,3 3,4 107,5 -110,8 7,4 -23,7 1993-94 5 
